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Abstract 
In the current economy, the cost of damage to the environment is often external, which is likely to 
lead to over-exploitation and inadequate provisioning. There are a variety of incentive-based 
schemes, such as effluent taxes or tradable permits, which attempt to confront the polluting agents 
with a ‘price’ equal to the marginal external cost of their activity. However, competitive incentives 
alone are not adequate for effective management of the shared resources. Thus, the current solutions 
exhibit several drawbacks including susceptibility to international free-riding, sensitivity to accurate 
estimation of cost of pollution or environmental targets, and inability to take the cumulative nature 
of pollution and its cost into account. 
This paper proposes an approach to eliminate the commons dilemma by using non-scalar numbers 
for the underlying economic signals. Rather than adding the cost of pollution to the cost of private 
resources, this cost is kept in a separate dimension represented by the second component of money 
and price. This separation enables us to develop more effective models for economic signals and 
incentives, and avoid the above-mentioned drawbacks. In the proposed design, the cost of pollution 
is cumulative and would have a progressively higher economic impact on both the competitive and 
cooperative incentives for managing pollution leading to a provable sustainable point. Moreover, 
the proposed model does not suffer from the free rider problem; does not require accurate 
estimation of the true cost of pollution; is simple to implement and backward compatible with the 
current economy. 
 
Key Words: Environmental Economy, Global Commons, Non-Scalar Economy, Incentive-Based 
Schemes, Sustainability. 
1 Introduction 
The global environmental resources, such as the atmosphere and the oceans, have been used as 
‘waste-sinks’ for many years and the level of pollution is commonly viewed to be excessive. The 
current economy is reasonably effective in managing scarce resources that are privately owned. 
However, for global commons, the cost of damage is external and the appropriators continue to 
engage in pollution until its marginal benefit is zero [1]. This is likely to lead to over-exploitation, 
inadequate provisioning and perhaps irreversible damage. In essence, there is a failure of the 
doctrine of ‘invisible hand’ and economic agents face a ‘commons dilemma’ since pursuit of their 
self-interest may contravene the common good [2].  
A variety of incentive-based schemes, such as effluent taxes or tradable permits, have been 
proposed to ‘internalize’ this cost and confront the polluting agents with a ‘price’ equal to the 
marginal external cost of their activity [1][3]. However, with respect to management of global 
resources, there still remain some key weaknesses as outlined below: 
a) International free-riding: The commons dilemma favors free-riding as the dominant strategy, 
which makes partial agreements ineffective. It is often claimed that compliance reduces the 
international competitiveness of one’s country if some other countries do not comply [4]. The 
polluting firms could also relocate their operation to such countries creating significant political 
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pressure. Consequently, implementation of the above schemes requires global consensus and 
enforcement for effectiveness. 
b) Sensitivity to accurate evaluation of cost of pollution: For incentive-based schemes to result 
in pollution reduction, the marginal cost of pollution should exceed the marginal abatement 
cost. However, it is politically difficult to impose high costs on polluters or assess the true cost 
of pollution because various competing parties are strongly motivated to give distorted 
estimates [6][7]. International agreements on environmental targets also involve intense 
lobbying and prolonged negotiations. As a result, the policy objectives are often set 
conservatively with suboptimal outcome [3][9][10].  
c) Cumulative nature of pollution: The impact of pollution in the real world is cumulative across 
time, space and multiple uses, which is not reflected in current schemes[5][11]. A particular 
polluting activity may indeed have negligible impact and cost in isolation, but when it is 
occurring after centuries of pollution, as part of a large community of polluters and compounded 
by other activities that also lead to pollution of the same resource, its impact may become 
significant. In other words, history matters and the system cannot be memory-less. The cost of 
pollution imposed on an economic agent must be an increasing function of how much pollution 
is created by others or this same agent in other contexts.  
The objective of this paper is to eliminate the commons dilemma by introducing a new concept of 
money and price based on two-dimensional numbers. One of these dimensions is responsible for 
managing private property and the other deals with the globally shared environmental resources. 
Rather than adding the cost of pollution to the cost of private resources, as is common in current 
incentive-based schemes, this cost is kept in a separate dimension represented by the second 
component of money and price. This separation enables us to develop more effective models for 
economic signals and incentives, and avoid the above-mentioned pitfalls and limitations.  
For example, in the proposed model the marginal cost of pollution can be controlled without the 
need to accurately estimate the cost of pollution. Moreover, this marginal cost can vary among the 
individuals or communities depending on their past polluting behavior and the level of 
accumulation of pollution in the economy. Another feature of the proposed design is that during a 
purchase operation, the pollution liability represented by the second component of price is 
transferred to the buyer’s money from the seller. The buyers, therefore, bear the economic 
consequences of supporting the pollution. However, supporting a polluting product does not reduce 
one’s wealth or cause transfer of wealth to another party. Since no one benefits from pollution, 
there would be no perverse incentives within the economy and the cooperative incentives for 
pollution abatement are strengthened.  
This conceptual change to non-scalar money and price has a profound impact on both competitive 
and cooperative incentives for managing pollution. In particular, the proposed model leads to a 
provable equilibrium point, in which the level of per-capita pollution accumulated in the economy 
is kept at a constant level. Moreover, it is easy for the society to change this level by adjusting a 
single macro-economic parameter, thereby steering the economy towards a sustainable point 
(Section 5). In addition, we will demonstrate the following properties for the proposed design: 
• No free-riding: Countries that do not participate in the scheme would be economically 
disadvantaged - Section 6.2. 
• The cumulative nature of pollution is taken into account:  The cost of pollution is 
cumulative and would have progressively higher economic impact - Section 5. 
• No dilemma: There is no conflict between individual desire for economic success and 
discharging one’s obligations towards the environment - Section 7.  
• No need for accurate estimation of cost of pollution: Sections 3.2.1 and 5. 
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• Practical to implement and backward compatible: There is no need for a disruptive 
introduction as the proposed economy is backward compatible with the current system and a 
smooth migration is possible - Section 6.1. 
• Simplicity of basic operations: The basic mathematical operations of the economy (Section 2) 
are simple and can be mastered during primary school years.  
To limit the scope of this article, the formal mathematical proofs are not included in the current text. 
These will be subject of future publications and can be obtained directly from the author. 
2 Mathematical Definitions, Operations, and Properties 
In this Section, a new class of two-dimensional numbers is introduced to be used as the basis of the 
proposed non-scalar money and price. A member of this class, such as x = (x1, x2), has two 
components. We require that both components be real numbers and the first component be non-
negative.  The set of these numbers could be viewed as coordinates of points on the two-
dimensional half-plane of real numbers (the other half is excluded because the first component 
cannot be negative), see Figure 1.  
The first component, x1, is called the Wealth Component (WLC) and is responsible for managing 
scarce resources that are privately owned. Accordingly, it performs a role similar to the scalar 
money and price and current intuitions about its meaning and function are largely applicable.  
The second component, x2, is called the Pollution Liability Component (PLC), which manages the 
scarcity of globally shared resources of interest. Note that current understanding about the meaning 
of ‘liability’ could be misleading and the PLC role becomes clear as the properties of non-scalar 
economy are investigated further in this Section.  
Both of these components have the same units of currency, such as dollars. We refer to an economy 
based on non-scalar money and price as non-scalar economy, in contrast to the current (scalar) 
economy. 
Example – price: In non-scalar economy, the price of an item may be $(10, 1.60). This means that 
the seller is asking for $10 of Wealth Component (WLC) to compensate for all the privately owned 
resources, such as labor, materials, plant, used throughout the supply chain for this product up to 
this phase. It also means that the seller is claiming that $1.60 of Pollution Liability Component 
(PLC) was incurred in total by all the entities involved (extraction of raw materials, electricity 
generation, transport, refrigeration, etc.) to get the product to current stage. It is shown in Section 4 
that sellers would have very strong economic incentives to represent the PLC of price as accurately 
as possible otherwise they bear an economic cost. It is also shown that this accurate estimation is 
very easy for them. As a result, buyers can be confident that the PLC of price is reliable. 
Example – money:  In non-scalar economy, the balance of someone’s saving account might be 
$(100,5). This means that the owner has accumulated $100 of Wealth Component and $5 of 
Pollution Liability Component in this account. The role and impact of the latter on the owner’s 
buying power will be discussed later in this section. 
2.1 The impact of PLC: Index of money and price 
Our aim is to find a suitable metric to measure how prominent the second component (PLC) of 
money and price is with respect to the first component. As mentioned before, a mere comparison of 
magnitudes is not a good indicator. Hence, in this paper for every x = (x1, x2), be it price or money, 
we use the ratio )/( 212 xxx +  for this purpose. Let us call this metric the Liability Index of x (or 
Index of x for short). When the PLC is zero or negative, we define the Index to be zero because a 
negative Index is not a useful concept. Therefore, the Liability Index of x, denoted by I(x), is 
defined as follows: 
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Based on the above definition, the Index of any money or price is always between 0 and 1. The 
closer the Index to one, the more prominent is the PLC. 
2.2 The Limit on the Index of money 
It is not appropriate to impose any limits on the Index of a price, because we would like the price to 
reflect the ‘reality’ – that is, the true combination of cost of private and shared resources used in 
production. However, for money, the economy should impose a limit on how large the Index could 
be. This limit - called the Liability Index Threshold - is mathematically enforced on all the 
operations of the economy ensuring that the Index of money is always below this threshold (see 
Section 2.3). The Liability Index Threshold, or LI Threshold for short, is a number between 0 and 1, 
excluding zero, which is assigned to every economic agent, such as an individual, a firm, or a 
government department, by the regulator. Also, we will see that the regulator is bound to confine 
the Liability Index Thresholds within a certain range based on the environmental efficiency of the 
country’s economy (see Section 3.3).  
In Figure 1, the locus of all non-scalar numbers with Index equal to the Liability Index Threshold λ 
is shown as a thick solid line. For someone whose LI Threshold is λ, the Money Domain is shown 
as a shaded area below and including this line. The Index of any number above this area would be 
above the LI Threshold and hence these numbers cannot be money.  
2.3 Defined operations for money and price 
The following mathematical operations are defined for the non-scalar economy. 
1- Addition: The familiar component-wise addition is defined for money and price as follows:  
),(),(),( 22112121 yxyxyyxx ++!+         
 
Figure 1: Two-dimensional half-plane for money and price, Money Domain and LI Threshold 
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This operation could be used to add prices, for example, prices of items in a shopping trolley to get 
the total price; or add monies, for example, different account balances to get one’s total money. It is 
not meaningful to add a price to money or vice versa. 
2- Subtraction: The familiar component-wise subtraction is defined for non-scalar money and 
price, provided the result is valid:  
),(),(),( 22112121 yxyxyyxx !!"!         
When subtracting prices from each other, the result must be a valid price, that is, with non-negative 
WLC. In case of money, for example, withdrawing money from an account, the result must be valid 
money, that is, its Liability Index should not exceed the LI Threshold.  
It is not meaningful to subtract a price from money or vice versa. 
3- Purchase: In the current economy, the purchase operation is a subtraction of price from tendered 
money. In non-scalar economy, the purchase operation is not subtraction, but still very simple. Let 
the buyer’s money before the purchase be x = (x1, x2) and assume that buyer intends to purchase a 
product priced at a = (a1, a2). The buyer’s money after the purchase is obtained by performing a 
purchase operation on x and a as defined below.  
),( 21 xx  ),(),( 221121 axaxaa +!"       
The purchase operation can take place provided the result is valid money. In other words, the Index 
of (x1 - a1, x2 + a2) must not exceed the buyer’s LI Threshold. Otherwise, we say that x does not 
have sufficient funds to make this purchase. In the example of Figure 2, $x can purchase an item 
priced at $a, but does not have sufficient buying power to purchase $b.  
4- Sell: Assume that seller’s money before the sale is w = (w1, w2). After selling an item priced at a 
= (a1, a2), the seller’s money can be calculated as follows:                                                              
Again, the result of a sell operation must be valid money. 
s ),(),( 221121 awawaa !+"),( 21 ww       
 
Figure 2: (a) x can purchase a; (b) x cannot purchase b 
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The interpretation of purchase and sell operations is straightforward. The buyer pays for the Wealth 
Component of price to compensate the seller for all the privately owned resources used in 
producing the good. The buyer also accepts the Pollution Liability Component of price, which is 
transferred to his money and deducted from seller’s.  
The above set of definitions and operations completes the mathematical design of the non-scalar 
economy. The rest of this paper attempts to explore the ramifications of living in an economy based 
on this design and discusses practical implementation issues. 
2.4 Buying Power of money and Magnitude of price 
As shown in Figure 2, a buyer is able to purchase a good provided the result of the purchase 
operation is valid money. To check affordability, therefore, one can use this operation and examine 
the result to see if the purchase can take place. But money and price have two components and the 
interplay between these components in determining how expensive the price is, or the amount of 
buying power in the money may not be obvious. To assist with understanding and also analysis, in 
this section we introduce two useful quantities for this purpose. 
Buying Power of money: Consider money x = (x1, x2) shown in Figure 3-(a). After any purchase, 
the buyer’s money gets ‘closer’ to the Liability Index Threshold1 (see Figure 2). In fact, if the 
buyer’s money is already on the LI Threshold – that is, its Index is equal to the LI Threshold - it 
cannot buy anything. For example, money y in Figure 3-(a) still contains wealth (in the sense that 
its Wealth Component, WLC, is not zero), but does not have any buying power. Consequently, the 
‘distance’ of money from the LI Threshold is a good measure of the amount of buying power. 
Formally, we define the Buying Power of money as the Wealth Component of the maximum price 
of the form (B,0) that can be purchased. Geometrically, this is the length of the horizontal line 
segment between the money and the LI Threshold as shown in Figure 3-(a). Mathematically, the 
Buying Power of money x with respect to LI Threshold λ, denoted by Bλ(x) is obtained as follows: 
! 
B"(x) =
x1 # $ x2       if x2 > 0









.       
Note that Buying Power of money is always evaluated with respect to its owner’s LI Threshold. 
Also note that Buying Power can never exceed the Wealth Component of money. In other words, 
there is no Buying Power in the PLC component of money and even if the PLC is negative or zero, 
the Buying Power at most becomes equal to WLC. For example, if λ = 0.4 (ρ = 1.5), the Buying 
Power of $(100,5) is $92.5. 
Magnitude of price: Similarly, we can define a scalar quantity, referred to as Magnitude of price, 
to measure how ‘expensive’ a price is for the buyer. The Magnitude of price a = (a1, a2) with 
respect to the buyer’s Liability Index Threshold λ, denoted by Mλ(a), is defined as the amount of 
Buying Power lost in purchasing this price when the buyer’s money has non-negative PLC. It can 
be shown that the Magnitude is obtained by the following equation: 
! 
M"(a) = a1 + # a2        
It can be proved that a buyer is able to purchase an item if the Buying Power of his money is greater 
than, or at least equal to, the Magnitude of price – both evaluated with respect to the buyer’s 
Liability Index Threshold. This is because of the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: Purchase operation on money x and price a, both with non-negative PLC, is valid if 
and only if
! 
B"(x) # M"(a) .
2 (Proof is straightforward and omitted for brevity.) 
                                                
1 This statement applies to buying ordinary goods and not the environmental goods described in Section 4. Purchase of 
environmental goods increases one’s Buying Power and moves money ‘away’ from the LI Threshold. 
2 If the PLC of money is negative, x can absorb certain level of PLC in the price without losing Buying Power, but as 
soon as PLC of money becomes zero the above theorem holds. 
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For example, if x = $(50, 10) and a = $(35, 8), for λ = 0.6 Buying Power of x is $43.3 and 
Magnitude of a is $40.3 (so x can purchase a). For λ = 0.5, Buying Power of x is $40 and 
Magnitude of a is $43 (so x cannot purchase a).  
The above theorem specifies a necessary and sufficient condition; hence the definitions of Buying 
Power and Magnitude provide a rigorous basis for determining affordability. 
2.5 Marginal Cost of PLC 
The parameter ρ in the expressions for Buying Power of money and Magnitude of price plays a 
critical role in the proposed non-scalar economy. Hereafter, this parameter is referred to as the 
Marginal Cost of PLC 3 and represents the impact of PLC on Buying Power of money and 
Magnitude of price. 
To illustrate this point, consider money x with positive PLC. The Buying Power of x is equal to 
21  xx !" . This means that for every extra dollar of PLC, the Buying Power is reduced further by ρ 
dollars4.  Note that the total wealth contained in money is intact. In other words, this is not a 
‘pollution tax’ that the owner has paid. The presence of PLC only makes a certain amount of 
Buying Power inaccessible. Hereafter, we say that some of the Buying Power is locked up against 
the PLC. This locked up Buying Power could be released (made accessible to the owner) if the PLC 
is reduced. By reducing every dollar of PLC, ρ dollars of Buying Power is released, up to the point 
when PLC becomes zero. So ρ is also the marginal benefit of reducing PLC. Likewise, the 
Magnitude of price, a1 + ρ a2, increases by ρ dollars for every additional dollar of PLC in the price5.  
Hence, the Marginal Cost of PLC, ρ, measures the impact of PLC in reducing Buying Power on one 
hand and increasing the perceived Magnitude of price on the other hand. The Marginal Cost of PLC 
depends on the LI Threshold and, therefore, in general it would vary among the population. The 
                                                
3 Our terminology is rather loose here for convenience. To be precise, parameter ρ should be called the Lower Bound on 
Marginal Cost of PLC because the prospect of changes in the Liability Index Threshold increases the Marginal Cost of 
PLC above this value (Section 5). But for a short period of time, when the Liability Index Threshold is fixed, ρ is 
applicable. In general, there is no relationship between Marginal Cost of PLC and the actual marginal cost of pollution. 
However, at the sustainable point it may be argued that these two coincide. 











= $ .  
 
Figure 3: (a) Buying Power of money; (b) relationship between Marginal Cost of PLC and LI Threshold 
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relationship between ρ and λ is shown in Figure 3-(b). This non-linear relation is very useful as it 
allows ρ to assume any positive value and enables us to control ρ by altering the LI Threshold 
individually (see Section 3.3). 
2.6 Summary and comparison 
To summarize the discussions of this Section, consider a simple example regarding the annual 
income and expenses of a family (Table 1). The gross annual salary of this family is $(85000, 0). 
The PLC of salary is assumed to be zero because, typically, the pollution liability associated with 
the operation of employer’s business is transferred to the customers (via the sell operation) or 
shareholders (via dividends) and not to employees – see Section 4.  
The annual tax imposed on this family is $(35000, 800). The government would accumulate PLC 
while running its services and operations. Thus, the Liability Index of tax is calculated and applied 
to all collected taxes. The tax ‘deduction’ in non-scalar economy is a purchase operation. In 
essence, we are purchasing our share of government services. The net annual income after tax is:  
$(85000, 0)$(35000, 800) = $(50000, 800). 
Table 1 shows the annual prices for various expenses. Each firm estimates the PLC of its price to 
avoid accumulation of PLC within the firm (Section 4). If the family were able to buy these goods, 
their net balance would be $(3800, 2200). In the Table, three cases are shown with different 
Liability Index Thresholds. For each case, the Magnitude of prices and the final Buying Power left 
for the family are shown. For case 3, the LI Threshold is such that the family cannot afford to buy 
all of these products. So either they should reduce their consumption or shop around to substitute by 
more affordable products.  
For the first two cases, this family accumulates $2200 of PLC during this year, which locks up 
$2200 or $3300 of their Buying Power for LI Thresholds of 0.5 and 0.4 respectively. If they do 
nothing to reduce this PLC, after several years of accumulation, potentially a significant amount of 
Buying Power could become inaccessible. However, their wealth still belongs to them and is in 
their bank account so their incentive to release this locked up Buying Power grows stronger. It is 
shown later (Section 3.3) that their LI Threshold may also be lowered. With a lower LI Threshold, 
the Marginal Cost of PLC goes up and more Buying Power is locked up against the same level of 
PLC. The incentive to reduce PLC grows stronger still. 
The Table also contains a comparison with an ‘equivalent’ situation in the scalar economy, whereby 
the same dollar values for cost of pollution (taxes or cost of permits) have been added to the price. 
In this case, the family pays $2200 of ‘tax’ regardless of their previous history. The cost of 
pollution is buried in the prices and is not visible to the buyer. Payment of these pollution charges 
generates revenue for others and the family would hope that the agency who received the revenue 
will do something to undo the damage to the environment, but this is not enforced by the economy. 
There is no visible accumulation of the environmental cost and no economic impact specific to 
accumulation, so if the cost is not significant at this stage, it would be swamped by other concerns 
and is unlikely to cause a change of behavior.  
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of income and expenses for a family in both economies 
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3 Creation and Removal of Pollution Liability 
In non-scalar economy, operations of purchase and sell result in transfer of PLC from one 
economic entity to another. Thus, the pollution liability circulates in the economy. However, it has 
to be created because of appropriation, and removed from circulation due to provisioning activity. 
It is proposed here to have a separate entity charged with overseeing the creation and removal of 
pollution liability. For management of privately owned resources, the economy needs external 
organizations to enforce ownership rights. Because the global commons are shared, there is no need 
for a legal and judiciary system to enforce ownership. What is required is an independent 
accounting authority to keep track of appropriation and provisioning activities. Let us refer to this 
as the Accounting Authority for Pollution Liability (AAPL). 
AAPL is created by all those countries that have decided to adopt the non-scalar economy. AAPL is 
independent of the government and is not a ‘regulator’. Its role is not to prescribe certain practices 
and enforce environmental standards or targets. It merely keeps track (account) of appropriation and 
provisioning levels.  
AAPL is responsible for three primary functions: (i) creation of pollution liability as a result of 
appropriation and assigning this liability to the appropriator; (ii) removal of pollution liability as a 
result of provisioning activity; and (iii) imposing a suitable Liability Index Range (LI Range) on 
each participating country based on an internationally agreed formula. These functions are briefly 
described below. 
3.1 Creation of Pollution Liability 
AAPL monitors the appropriation of global resources and, in response, assigns suitable values of 
PLC to the appropriator. The price of appropriation is of the form (0, b), which the appropriator 
has to purchase. Note that the Wealth Component of this price is zero. Hence, AAPL does not 
receive any revenue (Buying Power) as a result of pollution. AAPL does not impose any ceiling on 
the amount of appropriation of a resource. It calculates and assigns PLC based on every unit of 
resource, e.g. one cubic meter of air or water polluted. 
3.2 Removal of Pollution Liability 
Let us define any activity that attempts to undo the effect of pollution and restore the resource to its 
original condition as provisioning function6. In the non-scalar economy, the entity engaged in 
provisioning can transfer some PLC to AAPL. This transfer can be viewed as a sell operation which 
has a price in the form of (0, c). The PLC transferred to AAPL after this operation is removed from 
circulation. Once again, there is no transfer of Wealth Component during removal to/from AAPL. 
Different scenarios for PLC removal can be envisaged. For example: 
a) Individual or community initiatives: These initiatives may involve restoration, clean up, 
waste management and similar activities accredited by AAPL.  
b) Environmental Firms: The core competency of these firms is to restore the damage caused by 
pollution. The ‘product’ sold by these firms is called an environmental good and has a price 
with negative PLC of the form (e1, -e2)7. By purchasing an environmental good, the buyer loses 
$e1 of WLC, with a corresponding Buying Power loss of $e1, and also reduces his/her PLC by 
$e2 , which may increase Buying Power by up to $ 2 e! . Depending on buyer’s LI Threshold 
this purchase could have a positive return and increase the buyer’s Buying Power. In addition, 
the environmental firms may return dividends with negative PLC to their shareholders.  
                                                
6 We distinguish between abatement and provisioning activities. Pollution abatement reduces the rate of creation of 
PLC during manufacturing or delivery of a service. Provisioning activity is concerned with clean up after the pollution 
has been created. The environmental sector in non-scalar economy could have both of these activities. 
7 We use the negative sign to emphasize that the PLC of price is negative. That is, e2 is the absolute value of PLC. 
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c) Discounting due to natural regeneration: An agreed level of PLC reduction is applied to all 
on regular time intervals to represent the natural regeneration capacity of the environment.  
Figure 4 shows a representation of PLC creation and removal functions as a ‘leaky bucket’. The 
PLC is created as a result of appropriation and flows into the economy. The rate of in-flow of PLC 
can be reduced by abatement activities and better technology. The PLC circulates in the economy 
and as the in-flow continues the level of accumulation (the depth of the bucket) increases. At the 
same time, the bucket is leaking - there is some outflow due to natural discounting and some due to 
provisioning, if any. The environmental sector influences the amount of PLC in circulation via 
abatement and provisioning activities. It is shown in Section 5 that the proposed non-scalar 
economy always reaches an Equilibrium Point, at which the bucket depth remains at a constant 
level. It is also shown that it is very easy for the society to control the depth of bucket at the 
Equilibrium Point by modifying a single macro-economic parameter. 
3.2.1 The unit price of environmental resources 
During creation and removal of PLC, AAPL has to put a dollar value on a ‘unit’ of polluted 
resource. For example, if atmosphere and water are selected to be managed by the non-scalar 
economy, there is a unit price associated with appropriation of one cubic meter of air or water - say, 
$(0, a) and $(0, w) respectively.  
One way to incorporate different pollutants into this model is to agree on a ‘safe’ level of 
concentration of each pollutant per unit of resource. If the appropriator emits this safe level, one 
unit of resource has been made unavailable to others to use as waste-sink.  
A key feature of the non-scalar economy is that it is not sensitive to the magnitude of unit prices, 
such as a and w in the above example. Any number will do as long as it is applied consistently. The 
reason is that the magnitude of PLC by itself does not have any economic significance, what matters 
is the relative magnitude of the product of PLC and ρ in comparison to WLC. For example, 
consider X = $(100, 80) and Y = $(100, 3). Without further information, no assessment can be 
made about the significance of markedly different PLCs ($80 versus $3) in X and Y. This is 
because ρ can be made arbitrarily large or small depending on the assigned Liability Index 
Thresholds. For example, if the LI Thresholds of owners of X and Y were 0.9 and 0.2 respectively, 
X would have more Buying Power than Y ($91 versus $88). 
3.3 Imposition of Liability Index Range on Participating Countries 
The third role of AAPL is to impose a Liability Index Range on every country that has adopted the 
non-scalar economy based on an agreed formula. The Liability Index Range is defined as a range of 
PLC in 
circulation
Creation of Pollution 
Liability as a result of 
direct appropriation
Removal of PLC as a result 
of natural regeneration 
(discounting)
Removal of PLC as a result 
of provisioning activity
Amount of PLC in 
circulation - k
(depth of the bucket)
Abatement activity 




Figure 4: Creation and removal of PLC and the impact of environmental sector 
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allowed LI Threshold values between a maximum and a minimum. The LI Thresholds of 
individuals, firms, and other entities within the country must always be less than the upper bound of 
the imposed LI Range and are recommended to be within this range. The actual LI Thresholds are 
chosen by the government based on their economic policy – see Figure 5.  
For example, if the LI Range imposed on a country is [0.40, 0.45], the LI Thresholds of economic 
entities in this country cannot exceed 0.45. It is also recommended that these be in the inclusive 
range of 0.40 to 0.45. The government might assign everyone the same LI Threshold from this 
range or adopt a more sophisticated policy (Section 5). 
AAPL determines the Liability Index Range of every country based on a formula agreed by all the 
participating countries. The exact nature of this formula is outside the scope of this paper. However, 
the LI Range is required to be a monotonically decreasing function of per-capita PLC in 
circulation. Figure 5-(a) shows one possible example where the LI Range is progressively 
decreased in response to the growth of per-capita PLC in circulation. Note that calculating the 
amount of PLC in circulation is straightforward for AAPL, because AAPL is the only authority 
responsible for creation and removal of PLC and can monitor the PLC transfer in/out of the 
economy due to import/export.  
3.3.1 The impact of lowering the Liability Index Threshold of an entity 
For an economic agent, lowering the LI Threshold has the effect of increasing the Marginal Cost of 
PLC - see Figure 3-(b). Consequently: 
• For every dollar of PLC in money, more buying power is locked up. This applies 
retrospectively to all accumulated PLC. 
• For every dollar of PLC in prices, the perceived Magnitude of price would be higher and 
more Buying Power is lost due to purchase. 
• The perceived return is higher when purchasing an environmental good or investing in the 
environmental sector. 
So altogether, a lower LI Threshold encourages reduced consumption, especially of goods and 
services that have high PLC in their prices, and more investment in environmental sector with the 
purpose of reducing one’s accumulated PLC. 
3.3.2 The impact of lowering the Liability Index Range of a country 
Typically, when the LI Range of a country is changed, the LI Thresholds of economic entities are 
mapped to new values within the new range - Figure 5-(b). So, when the LI Range is lowered, 
everyone would experience a corresponding reduction of LI Threshold. Consequently, the whole 
 
Figure 5: (a) Variation of LI Range in response to increases in per-capita PLC in circulation; (b) Mapping the LI 
Thresholds to new values in response to change of LI Range 
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economy must reduce consumption, especially of goods and services that are pollution intensive, 
and increase investment in the environmental sector.  
The combination of these effects could trigger cooperative and competitive incentives to reduce the 
total PLC in circulation. In other words, the LI Range influences the balance between the amount of 
investment and effort devoted to pollution abatement and provisioning on one hand and production 
of goods and services for people on the other hand. It determines the size of the environmental 
sector versus other sectors.  
4 Market Interactions  
In non-scalar economy, two categories of firms can be distinguished. The first category or 
‘traditional’ firms are called wealth generating firms and are engaged in production of goods and 
services for humans. A distinguishing feature of these firms is that the PLC of their prices and 
dividends is non-negative.  The second category is referred to as environmental firms. These firms 
are engaged in environmental restoration and their products are referred to as environmental goods. 
The price of environmental goods and dividends of these firms have negative PLC.  
Table 2 shows typical transactions for both categories. The first three transactions are similar:  
1. The firm may directly be engaged in appropriation of global commons such as discharge of 
waste into the atmosphere or oceans. In this case, the pollution liability associated with these 
activities is created by AAPL and sold to the firm (Section 3.1). 
2. The firm almost always creates pollution indirectly by purchasing other goods for its 
operation, such as electricity, transport, computers, raw materials, and so forth. The PLC 
associated with these is transferred to the firm via purchase operation. 
3. The firm pays for its workforce (subtraction operation). 
For wealth generating firms, the output is a product or service sold to the intended market. During 
the sell operation a certain amount of PLC as specified by the price is transferred to the firm’s 
customers. Three cases can be identified: 
a) If the PLC of price under-estimates the total pollution, directly and indirectly, caused by the 
firm’s operation then the sell operation does not transfer the entire PLC to customers and there 
would be some accumulation of PLC within the firm. This PLC could either be transferred to 
the shareholders via dividends (who probably would not be pleased) or retained by the firm 
causing reduction of Buying Power and perhaps lowering the LI Threshold - Figure 8. 
b) If the PLC of price over-estimates the pollution caused by the firm’s operation, perhaps to 
compensate for the under-estimation of PLC during the previous offering, the firm depletes its 
accumulated PLC. However, customers perceive a higher Magnitude for the price and 
depending on their Marginal Cost of PLC may reject the product. Furthermore, the PLC of price 
clearly demonstrates to them that the higher Magnitude is due to polluting impact of firm’s 
operation and not any other variation in cost factors.  
c) If the PLC is accurately estimated, the pricing strategy is referred to as neutral pricing (neutral 
with respect to PLC accumulation). It can be shown that this is the best strategy in the long run. 
(The proof is outside the scope of this paper and will be subject of future publications.) 
Table 2 also demonstrates that it is easy for the firm to adopt a neutral pricing strategy as the non-
scalar economy provides all necessary information to work out the balance of PLC. 
Non-Scalar Economy 13 
In the case of environmental firms, the provisioning activity results in transfer of PLC to AAPL. 
The firm may sell a number of environmental goods. The price of an environmental good has 
negative PLC. Purchasing an environmental good reduces the buyer’s accumulated PLC and 
transfers certain amount of Wealth Component to the firm. The former helps the buyer to manage 
the PLC accumulation in his/her money. The latter compensates the firm for the cost of privately 
owned resources, such as labor and materials, used for its operation. For example, if the buyer’s 
money is $(100, 40) and his LI Threshold is 0.4 (Buying Power = $40), purchasing an 
environmental good priced at $(10, -10) results in $(90, 30) with Buying Power of $45.  
The environmental firms do not generate wealth or Buying Power directly as these firms are 
focused on environmental restoration as opposed to providing amenities for humans. Their output 
unlocks existing Buying Power that has been made inaccessible due to PLC. 
5 Equilibrium and Sustainable Points 
In this Section, it is shown that a non-scalar economy with a monotonically decreasing function for 
variations of LI Range achieves an equilibrium state if at all feasible, that is, if the marginal cost is 
finite. The Equilibrium Point is defined as a state of economy when the per-capita PLC in 
circulation is held at a constant level (see Figure 4). At this point the marginal benefit of reducing 
per-capita PLC in circulation becomes equal to its marginal cost.  
Let us denote the per-capita PLC in circulation by k. It can be shown that the marginal benefit of 
reducing k is bounded within the range of 
! 
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Table 2: The transactions of wealth generating and environmental provisioning firms 
 
Figure 6: The bounds on the marginal cost of reducing per-capita PLC in circulation 
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the LI Threshold imposed at k. (The proof is outside the scope of this paper and will be subject of 
future publications.) As for the marginal cost of reducing k, the shape of this function cannot be 
ascertained at this stage and would depend on the efficiency of the environmental sector, level of 
competition, spending on R&D and advancements in technology. However, evaluation of this 
function would be quite feasible given the exact accounting information readily available when the 
non-scalar economy is operational. It is reasonable to assume that this is a monotonically 
decreasing function of k due to economies of scale and usually high establishment cost of 
infrastructure for abatement and provisioning.  
Figure 7 shows the Equilibrium Points as the intersection points of a hypothetical marginal cost 





 in response to rising k, denoted by α in the Figure. In this Figure, only the upper 
bound of marginal benefit (
! 
ˆ " ) is shown. The actual value would be somewhere between the upper 
and lower bound (ρ) as shown in Figure 6. Clearly, the marginal benefit of reducing k grows to 
arbitrarily large values in response to accumulation of PLC irrespective of unit prices associated 
with global resources. Hence, for any finite marginal cost and regardless of the shape of this 
function, there would be an intersection point.  
This mathematical property of the marginal benefit function is desirable and matches the 
cumulative characteristics of pollution in the real world. The same polluting activity may have 
negligible impact in a clean environment (k small). However, if it occurs at the time when the 
capacity of the resource in absorbing further pollution is at its limit (k large), this extra pollution 
might be enough to ‘push us over the edge’ and trigger irreversible and undesirable changes. 
Similarly, in non-scalar economy, the economic impact of pollution is amplified in response to 
cumulative context of pollution. By tuning the parameter α, the economy models the sensitivity of 
the environmental resource to accumulation of pollution. For example, by lowering α, capacity of 
the resource is modeled to be higher and Equilibrium Point occurs at a higher value of k - Figure 7.  
At the Equilibrium Point, the balance between provisioning, pollution abatement and appropriation 
activities are maintained at a level that does not lead to further accumulation of per-capita PLC. 
This does not imply that improvements in the standard of living are stopped. It merely states that 
the environmental sector has to grow with the economy or become more effective in reducing the 
polluting side effects of generating wealth.  
 
 
Figure 7: Equilibrium Points for different rates (α) of lowering LI Threshold in response to rising k  
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The Equilibrium Point, however, may not be a Sustainable Point because the accumulated level of 
pollution at the equilibrium may still be excessive for the resource. It is however evident from the 
above discussions that the value of k at the Equilibrium Point can be altered by adjusting the 
parameter α above. In this way, by tuning a single parameter the society is able to steer the 
economy towards a sustainable point. This ‘trial and error’ method is also used in current schemes 
for establishing tax levels or environmental targets [1][3][8].  
In the above derivation, we have assumed that everyone has the same LI Threshold within a given 
LI Range. While this is a possible policy for the government to adopt, a better incentive structure 
can be created by assigning different LI Thresholds to economic agents based on the level of 
pollution that they support. For example, the government policy may assign progressively lower LI 
Thresholds based on the accumulated PLC by the entity within the bounds of the LI Range - see 
Figure 8 for an example.  
6 Implementation Issues 
Changing the underlying structure of price and money may appear disruptive and impractical. 
However, for a given environmental objective, implementation of non-scalar economy may be 
easier than current schemes for the following reasons: 
1. Electronic Transactions:  The non-scalar economy is most suited to electronic 
transactions, which are becoming almost ubiquitous. A change of software is required to 
implement the new mathematical model and its operations (addition, subtraction, 
purchase and sell). It is also necessary to attach every debit and credit account to a 
Liability Index Threshold monitored and adjusted by the regulator. However, these 
changes are quite feasible. It is also possible to support cash transactions in non-scalar 
economy (details are omitted for brevity). 
2. Monitoring infrastructure: The existing infrastructure, deployed for other schemes 
could initially be used for non-scalar economy. There is no need to have everything 
ready on the first day and the scope of monitoring can be extended later. In general, the 
required monitoring infrastructure for non-scalar economy is similar to other schemes. 
3. No dilemma: The introduction of non-scalar economy is not a zero-sum game and there 
is no need to have any losers because no particular sector or group is unfairly targeted.  
4. Backward Compatible: (See below.) 
 
Figure 8: Possible variation of LI Threshold within the LI Range as a result of accumulation of PLC 
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5. No international free riding: (See below.) 
In the remainder of this Section, more details on items 4 and 5 are presented. 
6.1 Backward compatibility 
All the mathematical operations of the non-scalar economy are reduced to the current system - and 
the intuitive understandings coincide - when the Liability Index Threshold is set to one. In this case, 
people can ignore the PLC of price and money as the Marginal Cost of PLC is zero. 
Consequently, the non-scalar economy can be started by converting all monies and prices into two 
dimensional numbers with the second component set to zero. As there is no existing per-capita PLC 
in circulation (k = 0), AAPL would also set the Liability Index Range to [1.00, 1.00] which forces 
all Liability Index Thresholds to be 1.00. AAPL starts assigning pollution liability in major 
appropriation points that probably have existing infrastructure for monitoring. These include power 
generation plants, major mining and manufacturing firms and other pollution intensive industries. 
The unit price of global resources is selected to be a reasonable number but it does not need to be 
equal to the (unknown) cost of pollution.  
The PLC generated by these firms appears in their prices and is transferred to buyers. At this stage, 
buyers show little resistance to PLC of price, as it has no economic impact. Nevertheless, the PLC 
gradually trickles down to others and circulates within the economy. After a while, everyone would 
have some PLC and the economy as a whole would have accumulated a certain level of per-capita 
PLC (k > 0). In response to this accumulation and based on a formula known to all, the Liability 
Index Range is lowered, say to [0.95, 0.97], which raises the Marginal Cost of PLC slightly and 
locks up some Buying Power. As this process continues, people’s understanding of the new 
economy improves. They can also assess future opportunities in response to further lowering of 
Liability Index Range and adjust business practices, purchasing behavior and investment choices. 
The environmental sector experiences a significant growth and promotes innovation as investment 
in this sector becomes attractive. It is generally agreed that even current pollution regulations have 
resulted in the growth of pollution control sector [12]. After a period of transition, which can be 
made as long as necessary by altering the rate of variation of LI Range, the non-scalar economy 
diverges significantly from the current economy and a balanced strategy on appropriation and care 
for natural resources would have to be incorporated in every economic decision. 
6.2 International free-riding 
It is of course beneficial to start the non-scalar economy with an initial set of countries that are 
economically strong. These would agree on what resources to be managed and the parameters of 
model, and create AAPL for overseeing the appropriation and provisioning of these resources. 
Those countries that do not join, would incur some economic cost when trading with the non-scalar 
economy group. To illustrate this point consider the trade between two such countries, country A 
with non-scalar economy, and country B with current economy as shown in Figure 9. An exporter 
in B intends to sell some good to an importer in A. The scalar export price in B only reflects the 
cost of privately owned resources and is denoted by b1. Of course a scalar price cannot be used in 
A, so AAPL has to translate this into a two dimensional price. Given that B’s economy does not 
provide any information about the PLC of price, this component has to be estimated. One sensible 
approach would be to estimate the average Liability Index of the B’s economy8, denoted in the 
Figure by ! , and calculate the PLC of export prices of B using this common Index. In this case, 
                                                
8 Liability Index of an economy is defined as the Liability Index of the sum of all monies in the economy or 
alternatively as the ratio of the per-capita PLC in circulation over the sum of per-capita PLC and per-capita Wealth 
Component. Note that it is straightforward for AAPL to estimate this Index for a non-scalar economy. Likewise, based 
on industrial and environmental practices and observed per-capita PLC in circulation in non-scalar economies, it would 
be possible to extrapolate and provide a reasonable estimate for other (scalar) economies.  
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)1/( 12 !! "= bb . This PLC is then transferred to the importer in A when the purchase takes place. 
Note the following: 
• Transferring an estimated PLC to the importer in A is not a punitive measure or trade 
protection scheme to discourage imports from B. It is an impartial and honest attempt to 
provide a fair estimate for the PLC of price because the scalar economy does not provide the 
required information. After all, it would be neither fair nor correct to set this value to zero 
because almost no product can be produced without some level of PLC. 
• AAPL is not interfering in the economy of B. The estimated PLC is transferred to an entity 
in A, who is bound by the rules of non-scalar economy.  
In the other direction, consider an exporter in A with an export price of ),( 21 aa . As a result of this 
export, from the perspective of AAPL, a PLC to the value of 2a  would have to be transferred to the 
buyer in B. This is recorded by AAPL as a transfer to B’s economy and is used to update the 
estimated Liability Index of B. The importer in B would probably not care about the PLC 
component of price and has no incentive to reduce the accumulation of PLC in B (in AAPL’s 
books). Once again, recording the transfer of PLC during an export operation is not a punitive 
measure and is not interference in the affairs of B. It is simply an attempt to keep account of PLC, 
because a sell operation can only cause transfer of PLC and is not a removal operation.  
As a result, the scalar economy B is disadvantaged. First, their export prices might look 
uncompetitive to buyers in A for reasons that are beyond the control of producers in B. Second, the 
economy of B is used as a ‘dumping ground’ of PLC by exporters in A which raises the average 
Liability Index of B even further, reducing the competitiveness of its exports. Because the economy 
of B is not equipped with proper mechanisms to control and manage the PLC accumulation, the 
situation would progressively get worse. The export industries in B starve and to produce cheaper 
goods may resort to environmentally inferior techniques. This would prompt AAPL to update its 
estimate of B’s Liability Index and the cycle continues. The political and economic pressures may 
prompt some countries in the scalar group to revise their policy and adopt the non-scalar economy. 
By joining late, these countries have missed the early transition phase of implementation in 
synchronicity with other nations (Section 6.1). Their environmental sector is probably less 
developed and their transition is likely to be harder.     
 
 
Figure 9: Translation between scalar and non-scalar prices during trade between scalar and non-scalar 
economies 
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7 Comparison with other Incentive-Based Schemes 
On the surface, it might appear that the distinctions between non-scalar economy and existing 







’. Is this really different from the scalar price a1 that has been raised by ‘ρ a2’ due to 
pollution taxes or charges? When the Buying Power is equal to ‘x1 - ρ x2’, is this not the same as 
spending an extra ‘ρ x2’ dollars on charges associated with the environment? In this Section, we 
demonstrate that the differences between the two economies are profound with respect to both the 
accuracy of price signal and the economic incentives. 
Let us consider the prices first. Assume that there are two products of same quality, priced at P = 
$(80, 20) and Q = $(20, 80). (We ignore other spurious influences such as brand loyalty.) To 
simplify comparison, let the buyer’s LI Threshold be 0.5 (ρ = 1.0), which results in Magnitude of 
both P and Q to be $100. Despite having the same Magnitude, buyers could easily recognise that P 
and Q production methods have affected the environment differently. In addition, the economic 
impact of purchasing P or Q would also be different.  
It may be argued that similar information about the pollution effects of production could be 
provided in the current economy using mandatory labels accompanying the product. But 
determination of full effects of pollution in current economy is very difficult [7]. Production of 
goods causes pollution both directly and indirectly. While measuring the former is similar in both 
economies, the accounting for the indirect pollution would be error prone and quite complex in the 
current economy. The non-scalar economy accurately and automatically calculates the precise 
breakdown of price without any need for regulatory supervision. The incentives in the scalar 
economy, on the other hand, are probably in favour of hiding the true environmental cost of 
production, which is likely to lead to errors in estimation of this cost. These errors propagate when 
one product is used as an input for another production. The true contribution of environmental 
resources is diluted, obscured, and eventually lost among the ‘noise’ of other cost factors.  
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy: 
I. The price contains precise information about all the pollution caused by production, 
readily accessible to all and without a need for government mandates or supervision. 
II. The accuracy of information in the price is persistent and is not lost in the course of 
economic transactions. 
Consider a slightly different situation when the price for P is in fact $(85, 20). With the scalar price, 
P is more expensive than Q ($105 versus $100) and would be rejected in the market. The producers 
of P could try to inform consumers about the merits of their environmentally friendly production 
technique. Consumers must first trust the propaganda and then face a dilemma, because a decision 
to forego their self-interest and buy the more expensive product would be contrary to the economic 
‘reality’ signalled by the price. In the non-scalar economy there is no dilemma. Consumers can 
always be confident that an economic decision to purchase is consistent with their social 
obligations. They could safely ignore any advertising pleas for support and environmental-sounding 
names or logos. The price provides a full and accurate story.  
Economic decisions, however, vary in the population and depending on the LI Threshold there 
could be some who are more sensitive to PLC in prices. If the LI Threshold of a market segment 
were lower than 0.5, say 0.47, the perceived Magnitudes of P and Q would be $107.6 and $110.2 
respectively. This is not a subsidy for P. It is an economic differentiation influenced by the past 
buying behaviour and the level of pollution supported.  
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy: 
III. The information contained in the price alone is sufficient to provide a basis for an 
informed economic decision. 
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IV. Consumers can always use their economic judgment to support a product, as this is 
consistent with their social and environmental obligations. 
V. It is possible to differentiate between people based on their history of supporting pollution.  
Having established that the non-scalar economy is endowed with superior signals, we now turn our 
attention to economic incentives. In the current incentive-based schemes, the cost of natural 
resources is paid through taxes or purchase of permits and added to the cost of privately owned 
resources. By paying for the resource, the buyers could feel that their obligation toward the 
environment has been transferred to another party who has received the revenue and should now 
engage in undoing the damage. In non-scalar economy, on the other hand, the accountability for 
reducing PLC is always held by the entity benefiting from the pollution.  
Consider the two individuals of Table 3. For ease of comparison, the Liability Index Threshold of 
the individual in non-scalar economy is 0.5 (ρ = 1.0). Both start with an initial Buying Power of 
$500 and purchase a good with the Magnitude of $400, which includes $100 due to ‘cost’ of 
pollution. After the purchase, both are left with a total Buying Power of $100.  
Even if we ignore all the previous discussions, economically, these individuals are not equivalent. 
They both posses the same Buying Power but they differ with respect to their total wealth, the 
signals received from the economy, and their incentives for future economic activity.  
In the scalar economy, a $100 ‘tax’ has been paid and lost. The buyer would hope that the recipient 
of this revenue would use it to develop alternative production techniques or help the environment. 
But no such guarantee is enforced by the economy. In fact, revenues raised by pollution taxes are 
often diverted to other programs instead of pollution abatement [13].  
The buyer in the non-scalar economy, on the other hand, has supported a product with $100 of PLC. 
The transfer of this PLC to his money does not create revenue for anyone else. In this process, he 
does not lose any wealth either but $100 of his Buying Power is locked up (based on the LI 
Threshold of 0.5). This can be unlocked provided he reduces this PLC. Reduction of PLC can only 
be achieved by working or investing on the environment, such as buying an environmental good, 
and cannot be substituted by any other activity. This tight causal relationship is enforced by the 
economy as opposed to a social contract. More importantly, the semantic separation between WLC 
and PLC and the fact that economic operations keep track of both components leads to 
accumulation of PLC in time. In this example, receiving $100 of PLC might not be significant if 
viewed in isolation, but with the passage of time and going through many similar purchases, a large 
portion of the owner’s Buying Power could be locked up.  
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy: 
$100 $100 Buying Power after purchase
$(200, 100)$100 Balance of Money after purchase
$(300, 100)
$400
(includes $100 Pollution tax)
Price
$(500, 0)$500 Initial Money
Non-scalar Economy




Table 3: Comparison of two ‘equivalent’ purchases in scalar and non-scalar economies 
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VI. The accumulation of pollution liability is visible and has a progressively higher economic 
impact. Thus, of necessity, it leads to changes in behaviour and investment strategies.  
VII. The economy is accountable for pollution created and must invest some effort in 
restoration and abatement.  
VIII. Transfer of PLC does not generate revenue for anyone and, therefore, there are no 
perverse incentives in the economy.  
IX. The responsibility to reduce PLC is shared by all and is not monopolised by governments 
or people of good will. In particular, the bulk of responsibility rests on people who benefit 
most from appropriation directly or indirectly. 
We now summarise other comparative points that were alluded to in the previous sections: 
X. In the non-scalar economy, the unit price of pollution to global resources can be set to an 
arbitrary value and there is no need to estimate the true cost of pollution (Section 3.2.1). 
XI. Non-scalar economy provides a unified framework as opposed to a narrowly defined target 
for a particular pollutant. New pollutants and appropriation modes can be added to this 
framework and the scope of monitoring widened gradually. This may be viewed as a 
generalisation of ‘bubble’ and ‘netting’ provisions in current schemes [1].   
XII. International implementation of non-scalar economy does not require a strict global 
consensus and does not suffer from the free rider problem (Section 6.2). 
XIII. The non-scalar economy has been designed to be backward compatible with the current 
economy. So while the differences between the two economies might seem revolutionary, 
it is possible to evolve from the current economy gradually and without significant 
disruption (Section 6.1). 
XIV. The proposed system is not ‘hard coded’ with a pre-conceived notion of sustainability and 
is not prescriptive about the target levels of environmental purity that is desirable. It 
provides appropriate macro-economic parameters for the society to control and affect the 
level of pollution at the Equilibrium Point (Section 5) 
7.1 Co-existence with other schemes 
There may be local environmental targets that are more suited to be managed using existing 
schemes. For example, the regulator may wish to impose a ceiling on emissions of a particular 
pollutant with detrimental effects on the local ecosystem using taxes, permits or command and 
control. This may be required because the non-scalar economy would achieve an overall reduction 
of pollution but may not be specific enough for this pollutant. In general, it is possible for other 
schemes to co-exist with the non-scalar economy.   
8 Conclusions 
This paper proposes an approach to remove the commons dilemma by redesigning the concept of 
money and price based on two-dimensional numbers. Despite the simplicity of the underlying 
mathematical model, the proposed scheme is effective in aligning the cooperative and competitive 
incentives to attain a sustainable balance between usage and care for the commons. In this scheme, 
there is a complete alignment between economic prosperity and sustainability. All else being equal, 
the economy mirrors the state of the environment. In other words, the economy is affected 
negatively when the environmental condition deteriorates and vice versa.   
Moreover, the proposed model does not suffer from the free rider problem; does not require 
accurate estimation of the true cost of pollution; is simple to implement and backward compatible 
with the current economy. 
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